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ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENTLY CAUSING PRE-NATAL INJURIES
Recently two of the intermediate courts of Ohio have each
handed down a decision concerning pre-natal injuries. Both cases
involved very similar facts but the courts reached opposite conclu-
sions. This has given rise once more to discussions concerning the
rule followed almost universally in this country of denying a recov-
ery for injuries received by an infant while yet en ventre sa mere.
The opinion in the first of the two cases considered, that of
Mays v. Werngarten, followed the recognized rule;
2 and by blind
adherence to precedent denied that a right of action existed in favor
of the plaintiff. The unborn infant had been injured when the de-
fendent negligently permitted his automobile to strike the bus in
which plaintiff's encetnte mother was riding, thereby inflicting in-
juries on both the mother and the unborn plaintiff. However, in the
second case, Williams v. Marton Rapid Transit Inc.
2 a right of action
was granted to an infant who had been injured prior to his birth by
the negligent operation of a city bus operated by the defendant
whereby the mother was thrown to the ground causing severe
bruises to both the mother and unborn child. The court permitted
the child after his birth to recover for the injuries he had received
while yet in his mother's womb.
The court in the latter case, noting the conflicting rules of law
applied in the two cases, certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio the
question whether or not a right of action exists in favor of an in-
fant for prenatal injuries at common law. That court is now faced
with a situation in which it may either recognize the duty of the
law to keep abreast of an advancing civilization or adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis and render an opinion which recognizes a
wrong but refuses to grant a redress.
It must be admitted that by the overwhelming weight of au-
thority there can be no recovery for injuries received en ventre sa
mere. In fact, this writer has been able to discover only three cases
in which recovery was allowed. Of these one was by a lower court
of Pennsylvama4 which was overruled by a later case decided by the
highest court of that state;' the second permitted a recovery only
under a statute and not by a rule of the common law;' the third,
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, permitted a recovery only
by relying strongly on that remnant of the civil law which still pre-
182 N.E. 2d 421 (Ohio 1948).
24 RESTATEMENT, TORTS sec. 869 (1934).
'82 N.E. 2d 423 (Ohio 1948)
'Kine v Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 97 A.L.R. 1525 (1924)
'Berlin v. J. C. Penny & Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940).
'Scott v. McPhetters, 33 Cal. App. 629, 92 P 2d 678 (1939).
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vails in Canada as a vestige of the days when that country was New
France.! Any discussion of precedent in this field should recognize
that several of the cases have demed a recovery by an application of
the law of contract. That is to say, in most of the cases involving
common carriers the courts deny a recovery on the basis that since
no contract was made to carry the infant no duty was owed to pro-
tect him from harm.' Notable among these is the leading case of
Walker v. Great Northern Railways' in which two of the judges who
wrote opinions based the denial of a right of action entirely on a
lack of privity of contract.
The courts in denying a recovery in tort for injuries received
en ventre sa mere have consistently relied on one or more of the
following reasons for denying recovery*"'
1) The courts lack authority at common law to create
such an action, i.e., lack of precedent."
2) To permit such an action would open the courts to
a surge of trumped-up suits and invite perjury."
3) The child had no separate identity apart from the
mother, and therefore any duty of care was owed
only to her; a breach of that duty creates a right of
action in the mother only'
4) There was no such person in esse at the time of the
injury hence the defendant could not have injured
him.'
The merits, if any, of each of these contentions will be discussed
separately in an attempt to determine the validity of the announced
rule that there can be no recovery in such a case.
The validity of the first reason cannot be questioned if one is to
adhere rigorously to the doctrine of stare decisis. For at the present
time there is no case directly in point allowing a recovery without
the benefit of a statute or of the civil law. Yet it is submitted there
is much merit in the statement by Lord Mansfield, "The law of Eng-
'Montreal Tramways Co. v. Paul Leveille, 1933 S.C.R. 456, 4
D.L.R. 337 (1933).
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div 667, 139 N.Y.
Supp. 367 (1913).
"L.R. 28 Ir. 69 (1890).
"' Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921)
"Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939),
Peter Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884),
Buel v. United Rys. of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W 71 (1913)
' Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78
S.W 2d 944 (1935), Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214
Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
'Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900),
Ryan v Public Service Coordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14
A. 2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
"Lewis v Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W 2d 350 (Tex. Civ
App. 1943).
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land would be an absurd science were it founded on precedent only.
Precedents were to illustrate principles and to give them a fixed
certainty "" It should be the duty of the courts, within proper limits,
not merely to extract a rule of law from the cases, but to make an
appraisal and a comparison of the social values involved. The result
of such a balancing of values should be decisive in determining the
proper principle to apply in a given situation. Or as more cogently
stated by Justice Holmes, "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past." 6 It is suggested that now is the time to
stop following a rule laid down in a time when much less was known
of the medical facts of conception, gestation and parturition. With the
present day knowledge of obsetrics and gynecology, prenatal injuries
can be traced with a fair degree of certainty, hence the strongest
reasons for denying a right of action to the child have disappeared.
The law cannot long survive as a stagnant pool of decisions; it
must not be a dead thing. It must live and progress with our chang-
mg civilization. It must keep abreast of the other arts and sciences
if its existence is to be justified. Although precedent is valuable as
a stablizing influence and as a means whereby lawyers may predict
the legal rights and duties of their clients, unless a legal principle
can be justified without resort to precedent that principle has out-
lived its usefulness. Thus it readily appears that unless these de-
cisions can be supported by the remaining reasons they exist as a
rule of law without foundation.
It would appear there is more merit in the second contention
than in any of the other three. This fear, that the courts would be
swamped with fraudulent claims, was first expressed in the case of
Walker v. Great Northern Railway," wherein Justice O'Brien re-
marks, " on what a boundless sea of speculation in evidence this
new idea would launch us." The growth of the law in each of the
tort phases has-been preceded by comments that to so hold would
open wide the door to extravagance of testimony and lead in all
probability to fraud and perjury" Each time some far-seeing jurist
has had the courage to reject such arguments, and justice has not
suffered thereby nor have frauds been perpetrated on the courts by
applying old principles to new fact situations. No court should turn
justice aside and permit wrongs to go unremedied for fear it may
not be able to ascertain the true facts. One need not be apprehensive
of this point for, although special care will be required on the part
'I KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477 (11th ed., Coin-
stock, 1867)
"HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
"L.R. 28 Ir. 69 (1890)
"In this regard examine the development of the law in per-
mitting a recovery for mental anguish.
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of the judge when he instructs the jury in some cases, one may be
quite confident that the rules of evidence are adequate to require
satisfactory proof of responsibility Moreover, the determination of
the relation of cause and effect should not involve the court n any
greater difficulty than now exists in many cases.
The first impression created by reading these cases is that the
decisions could be defended on the ground of public policy if their
basis is that to allow such actions would promote fraud. That is to
say, there is a very real possibility that numerous ficticious suits
would be commenced in which the defendant would not be able to
prove the falsity of the claim. But for that reason must the poor,
unfortunate infant go through life with no recompense, all for the
good of the community at large? Is it truly impossible to permit the
infant to maintain such an action and at the same time provide ade-
quate judicial safeguards for the protection of the defendant? Would
the protection of the defendant be unreasonably lessened if the rule
were that the infant could recover for injuries received en ventre sa
mere provided the proof that his injuries were actually caused by
the defendant's negligent acts be clear, cogent, and convincing"
The contention that the child was not a separate entity apart
from its mother and hence no duty was owed to it, or that the tort-
feasor could not be aware of its presence, was a make-weight argu-
ment advanced at a time when relatively little was known of the
science of obstetrics. The court in Lipps v. Milwaukee Electrical Ry.
and Light Co.,' realizing the lack of merit in such an argument, at-
tempted to bolster its shaky position by saying, "Neither does the
medical or scientific recognition of the separate entity of an unborn
child aid in determining its legal rights. The law cannot always be
scientific or technically correct. It must often content itself with
being merely practical."' But it is practical that an infant injured
before its birth should go through life maimed because of this injury
and with no recompense from the tortfeasor 9 It is quite difficult to
perceive any great distinction between an injury to an unborn fetus,
at such a stage of development that if it were removed from its
mother it could survive and develop into a normal human being,
and an injury to that same being a few moments after its birth. It is
submitted that the ends of justice would be more fully served if the
fetus before it becomes viable should be considered as a part of its
mother and any injury to it be considered as an injury to her, but
that from the time viability is established the child should be con-
sidered in esse and a legal personality, entitled to a recovery in tort
for any injuries received while en ventre sa nereY'
The fallacy inherent in the reasoning of the cases becomes more
apparent each time they are examined. Surely there can be no de-
"'164 Wisc. 272, 159 N.W 916 (1916).
Id. at -, 159 N.W at 917.
"'See the dissenting opinion of Boggs, J., in Allaire v St. Luke's
Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, -, 56 N.E. 638, 642 (1900)
L.J3.-10
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fense to an action for negligence that the person injured was not at
the time enjoying an independent existence, but was dependent an
part at least on some other person or object for sustaining life; for,
indeed, if this reasoning were sound then if one negligently injures
a victim of a respiratory disease, while he is in an iron lung, he as
a tortfeasor could plausibly defend on the basis that this was no
human being, since its exisence was dependant on the iron lung and
the only injury for which he is responsible is that to the iron lung.
The absurdity of this is evident from a simple statement of the
proposition.
The final argument advanced in support of a denial of any such
right is much akin to the last; namely, there was no such person in
existence at the time of the mishap, hence he could not have sufferpd
any injury But the authorities are legion that the child will be recog-
nized as in existence from the time of his conception for any purpose
beneficial to him. A guardian may be appointed for himf2 An estate
may be given or bequeathed to him.3 Failure to provide necessities
for such a child will support a criminal action for failure to provide
necessities for an infant.'l He may also recover damages for the
death of his parents by the wrongs of others.5 In some instances to
take his life may be murder.' Yet despite the fact that it is beneficial
to be born uninjured, and if injured, to recover damages, the rule
stated above has yet to be applied in an action involving a prenatal
injury. A contrast of the result of the cases leads to the absurd para-
dox that the child's property is protected while his bodily integrity
is not, and an injury to him may be murder but not a private wrong.
Should the child be denied a recovery and an attempt be made
to balance the scales of justice by allowing the mother to recover for
all injuries not too remote, as has been attempted in some cases,"
there would still be an area of uncompensated damages. It has been
said, "The fact that the child was deformed, and would suffer
thereby, would cause the mother mental pain, and, even if she could
recover for that, the mental pain the child would suffer and the
mere fact of deformity with its consequent diminution of the value
of capacities and faculties could not be included in her recovery
So, however the subject be viewed, there is a residuum of injury
for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the child,
and it is a question of grave import whether one may wrongfully
2 Long v Blackhall, 3 Ves. 486, 30 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1797)
Marsellis v Thalhimer and others, 2 Paige 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66
(N.Y. 1830).
'People v Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 Pac. 961 (1931).
' Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W 1021
(1890)
26 Clarke v State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898)
Snow v Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933), Birmingham
Baptist Hospital v Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928).
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deform or otherwise injure an unborn child without making amends
to him after birth.' '
To base a decision on the contention that the child does not exist
until he has been separated from his mother by birth is to fly m
the face of medically proven fact. While presumptions both prima
facie and conclusive have a certain value in the law, the merit of
denying facts accepted by all of the other branches of science is
questionable to say the least. It appears that the courts have ac-
cepted at face value the story, told by prudish parents to their in-
quisitive offspring, that children are found under a mulberry bush,
and have predicated a rule of law thereon.
It is submitted that the ends of justice would be far better served
if the courts would discard their archaic precedents m this field
and make a re-evaluation of the principles involved. Admittedly
many of the later cases continue to be decided not on reason but on
precedent.' Yet judging from those opinions which have rested upon
an inquiry of the basis of the rule, it is apparent that the courts are
not wholeheartedly in support of the doctrine, but to some extent
have been straining at the leash and trying to break away.'
Would it not be a far better rule to permit any child born alive
who at the time of the injury could, if removed from his mother by
artificial means, live and develop as a normal child, to maintain an
action for these injuries and to permit a recovery by the infant pro-
vided the proof that such injuries were actually due to the negli-
gence of the defendant be clear, cogent, and convincing?
WILL A THRELKELD.
-Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, -, 739
N.Y. Supp. 367, 368 (1913).
'Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940).
"'Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc.
429, 14 A. 2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
